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THE TRANSFORMATIVE POTENTIAL
OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION'
By LUCIE E. WHITE*
PREFACE
I delivered the remarks that follow at the twentieth anniversary
of the Parkdale Clinic. Five years later, in November of 1996, I returned
to Toronto to speak at Parkdale's twenty-fifth anniversary celebration.
Much had changed, in the Parkdale neighbourhood and across Canada,
in those years. Just like the United States and other industrial countries,
Canada had substantially scaled back on its commitment to economic
and social security for impoverished groups during those years. At the
same time, however, new social mo'ements-of diverse groups of
women, immigrants from southern countries, and First Nations peoples
from within Canada's borders, for example-were challenging the state's
old ways of doing its business: its jurisdictional boundaries, its
conceptions of social citizenship, and its processes of law. In 1996, legal
workers and community residents at Parkdale were both angrier than
they had been five years before, and more creative, more audacious, in
the practice that they were calling "law."
The tenor of my own thinking about social change lawyering had
changed during those years as well. In my remarks at the twenty-fifth
anniversary, unlike the remarks from five years before that are finally
published in this volume, I could no longer offer any prescriptions or
advice to other political lawyers and clinical teachers. I could not even
offer prescriptions about what kinds of questions we should ask to
ourselves, to guide our practices. Rather, in my twenty-fifth anniversary
remarks, I invoked the title image of literary theorist Susan Suleiman's
brave book of unabashedly postmodernist reflections on ethical
© 1997, L.E. White.
* Professor, Harvard University Law School. At the time of writing, the author was a
professor at the UCLA School of Law. This comment was originally delivered as part of a panel
discussion on "The Transformative Potential of Clinical Legal Education," part of a symposium at
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judgment and political actionl And I spoke in fragmentary images,
images that did not claim to be grounded anywhere, except in what came
to mind as I put one step in front of the other in my own work.
In those remarks, I talked about moving ourselves to places
where relatively powerless people are pulling themselves together, be
those places food pantries, or abandoned buildings, or family court
waiting rooms, or the day rooms of mental health clinics, or battered
women's shelters, or production lines of sweatshops, or the promenades
of shopping malls. I talked about using our lawyers' knowledge and
power to help the people in those places to sustain and enhance the
enigmatic of safety, and healing, and mutual recognition, and
transformation that seem to happen, sometimes, in that space. I talked
about joining in the work of bringing those kinds of places and
moments-that kind of movement-inside our own everyday
professional and academic worlds. Finally, I talked about the
repositioning and recreation of our "selves"-our individual identities
and our sources of social and political power-that this kind of practice
might engender. Thus, I suggested that moving towards the places
where disenfranchised groups are finding and making justice, joining
with that work, and bringing that movement back inside of our own
"home" institutions, which tend to be sites of privilege, might chart new
pathways towards emancipation.
This symposium commemorates the twentieth anniversary of the
Parkdale clinic. For two decades, Parkdale has been in the forefront of
clinical education and poverty advocacy throughout Canada, and indeed,
beyond the Canadian border. Yet, in spite of the pre-eminence of
programs like Parkdale, clinical legal education has never been a
cohesive movement with a clear transformative vision for either law
schools or poverty law practice. Rather, clinical legal education has
described a range of innovations with diverse and even conflicting
ambitions. These innovations range from community-based poverty law
centres like Parkdale to simulation-based clinical classes in which
students learn "lawyering skills" abstracted from social or political
context.2
1 See S.R. Suleiman, Risking Who One Is: Encounters With Contemporary Art and Literature
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994).
2 I speak from the perspective of one whose formal legal education took place at a
neighbourhood-based clinical program like Parkdale; who began my own teaching career at a
clinical program funded by the Legal Services Corporation at a state law school; who spent six
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In this essay, I do not seek to analyze the full range of practices
that comprise clinical education. Nor do I seek to critique the "generic"
approach to teaching clinical skills that became popular in the 1980s,
exploring how that tradition, through its purported blindness to race and
class subordination, worked to reinforce, rather than reduce, race and
class privilege 3 That work has been undertaken by other clinical
scholars and it should continue. Rather, in this essay, I will focus on
clinics like Parkdale-the empowerment-focused, community-based
clinics that are both visionary in their goals and down-to-earth in their
law practices. I focus on the exemplary work of such clinics in order to
address the topic of this panel-the "transformative potential of clinical
legal education."
This phrase, "the transformative potential of clinical legal
education," immediately brings to mind a list of achievements. In their
first generation, community-based legal clinics like Parkdale have not
merely presented the potential for effecting far-reaching
"transformations;" those clinics have already contributed to institutional
and cultural change. The kinds of change that such clinics have
triggered are quite varied. At the top of the list of these changes is a
new approach to the practices of legal advocacy through which these
clinics have addressed the "legal problems" of individual clients.
Through the "client centred"4 advocacy that clinics like Parkdale have
modelled, the voices of clients are respected; their material burdens are
at least temporarily lightened; their understanding of the legal and
political systems is deepened; and their sense of both solidarity and
possibility is heightened. Through the community focus of these clinics,
grassroots organizations have been strengthened, or indeed given birth:
multiple, intersecting networks have been formed-among groups like
tenants, prisoners and their families, the physically and emotionally
challenged, battered women, marginalized workers, AIDS survivors,
undocumented immigrants. Through the institutional litigation of clinics
like Parkdale, local bureaucracies have been challenged and reined in.
extraordinary years learning from generous and wise colleagues at the UCLA Law School; and who
is currently seeking to reshape my own teaching and practice to address an increasingly skewed
division of wealth and power in my home city, and across the globe.
3 See, for example, W.H. Simon's classic article, "Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal
Formalism" (1980) 32 Stan. L Rev. 487. See also, for example, A.V. Alfieri, "The Antimonies of
Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialoglc Empowerment" (1988) 16 N.Y.U Rev. L. & Soc. Change 659;
and P. Goldfarb, "Beyond Cut Flowers: Developing a Clinical Perspective on Critical Legal Theory"
(1992) 43 Hastings LJ. 717.
4 See D.A. Binder & S.C. Price, Legal Interviewing and Counseling:.A Client-CenteredApproach
(St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1977); and the updated version, D.A. Binder, Lawyers as Counselors: A
Client-Centered Approach (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1991).
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When a robust clinic settles into a neighbourhood for the long haul,
people begin to- see how the everyday insults that they suffer-the
harassment, the evictions, the lay-offs-need not be accepted as routine
abuses of power. Rather, those injuries can be challenged as acts of
domination. With long-term support from clinics like Parkdale, people
can begin to fit those everyday injuries into larger patterns of
disenfranchisement-acts of violence-that must be contested because
lives are at stake. With people mobilized around these new
understandings, it can become too costly for a landlord or a boss to keep
someone quiet by putting her out. It can become too costly for a man to
take out his own frustration on a woman's body.
The transformative achievements of visionary clinics like
Parkdale go beyond imposing such behavioural controls on bullies.
Those achievements go beyond coercing those in power to respect the
rights of poor people in order to avoid punishment. In addition, the best
of our community-based clinics have sometimes sponsored programs
and .practices that help "perpetrators" to transform themselves.
Through support programs that such clinics sometimes host, people
within a clinic's community who have done violence to their families or
neighbours can glimpse alternatives to the habits of reactive domination
through which they have learned to take out their own frustration on
those they love.
Community-based clinics have not merely transformed
individuals and grassroots institutions. They have also transformed the
university itself. For individual students, a clinical experience can
transform career goals and professional self-conceptions. After going
through a clinic like Parkdale's, students often rethink their own roles as
social change lawyers, from that proverbial "hired gun" to that of a
"subject" and an "ally" in multidimensional practices of trasformation.
Clinics can also challenge the assumptions that have fixed the standard
law school curriculum. By providing models of experiential pedagogy
and by bringing public law advocacy to the top of the classroom agenda,
clinics have shown that law school programs do not have to stay mired in
the past. Clinics can educate other law school faculty about the realities
of poverty in their own communities, particularly when those faculty are
recruited to work on clinic projects. Clinics can also help redirect the
universities' research agendas, as the complexities of systematic poverty
and the challenges of poverty advocacy are subjected to sustained,
practically-grounded reflection. To be sure, few clinics, not even
Parkdale, have fully realized all of these transformative possibilities. Yet
the potential for clinical legal education to transform the people that
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they touch and the institutions in which they are embedded-that
potential is great indeed.
This strong vision of the transformative potential law school
clinic suggests ways that even the best of our clinics might be improved.
For instance, our university-based law school clinics might make greater
efforts to enlist their institutions' multidisciplinary research and teaching
resources into the clinics' work.5 All of our law schools might seek to
make clinical courses available to all law students, particularly in their
first year of law school, when their sense of vocation as lawyers is being
formed. Clinics might do more to prepare all students for public
service-the many students who will practise in private firms as well as
the few who will work full-time in public interest jobs. The clinics might
also become centres of theoretical work on advocacy, places where new
concepts of public interest lawyering emerge as students, community
members, and clinical faculty reflect together on their practice. 6 But
these potentials for improvement do not diminish the achievements that
clinics like Parkdale have already attained. Such clinics signal more than
a mere potential for transformation. They are also sites where
individual, institutional, and indeed societal transformation is well under
way.
Thus, clinical education of the Parkdale variety is already
bringing about important "transformations" in local worlds. And with a
few improvements, our clinics have the potential to effect
transformations in even wider spheres. Though this assessment of our
clinics' significance is a fair one, it is also somehow too glib. For this
rosy judgment about the transformative achievements and potential of
law school clinics is only one dimension of a much more complex reality.
To those positioned within the clinical legal education movement and
committed to the value of the work that they do, this judgment might
seem to tell the whole story, for those people are situated to see clinical
education as a powerful agent of the progressive transformation of the
social world. But this "insider" perspective is not the only vantage point
from which one might study the clinics' multiple, and often elusive, roles
in social change.
5 See, for example, the articles describing the work of the Interuniversity Consortium on
Poverty Law, published in volume 42 of the Washington University Journal of Urban and
Contemporay Law, especially: J.S. Lehman & R.E. Lento, "Law School Support for Community-
Based Economic Development in Low-Income Urban Neighborhoods" (1992) 42 Wash. U. J. Urb.
& Contemp. L 65; and G.L Blasi, "The 'Homeless Seminar' at UCLA" (1992) 42 Wash. U. J. Urb.
& Contemp. L 85.
6 See L White, "Paradox, Piece-Work, and Patience" (1992) 43 Hastings L.J. 853; and Blasi,
supra note 5.
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As I thought about this "insider" perspective on the clinics' roles
in supporting social change, I came back to the phrase with which my
reflection had begun-"the transformative potential of clinical legal
education." When I first heard the phrase, I had assumed that it
referred to the capacity of law school clinics like Parkdale to transform
other institutions and individuals in the law schools' local communities.
On reflection, I realized that several subtle assumptions were packed
into my seemingly "natural" reading of the phrase. First, there was the
assumption that those other institutions and individuals were indeed in
need of "transformation." Second, there was the assumption that legal
clinics are in a position to determine what "transformations" are needed,
and endowed with the social power to carry out the transformations that
they have first prescribed. Third, there was the assumption that clinical
educators and their students are an appropriate social agent to execute
those transformations. When these assumptions are spelled out, they
are quite clearly contestable; indeed, they sound somewhat obnoxious.
Particularly in contexts where clinics work with poor people, their
institutions, and their communities, it is hard to say exactly why lawyers
and legal clinics should designate ourselves to be the privileged agents of
other people's social and political change. From where does our
knowledge, power, and normative claim to assume their role purport to
come?
In this perplexed state of mind, I suddenly saw a hidden
ambiguity in the phrase with which all of this had begun. Like one of
those cut-out black-on-white silhouettes that at first appears to be a vase,
but on further study becomes two human figures facing each other in
profile, the syntax of this phrase, which had at first seemed so
straightforward, suddenly shifted on me. No longer did the phrase pose
the simple question of how our clinics have the potential to transform
the world. Instead, the phrase seemed to pose a much less comfortable
question. It seemed to ask the clinics how much potential they have to
change. Canwe, as progressive clinicians, transform who we are, how we
see ourselves, what we do-our own practices-so as to open those
practices to the knowledge, power, and human agency of the people with
whom we work? Do we as clinical legal educators have any potential to
deprivilege our own self-concepts, routines, and institutions, in the
interest of a more collaborative practice of advocacy toward social
justice?
This new reading of the potential for transformation does not
negate the accomplishments that legal clinics make in transforming
community institutions and law school routines. Rather, this new
reading introduces a tension, a counterpoint, that asks to be attended to
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at the same time that we survey our past accomplishments and map our
future possibilities. This counterpoint-this challenge to our own
legitimacy as the agents of other people's transformation-suggests
three questions. First, how much potential do we really have to change
ourselves-the profession and the pedagogy of lawyering-before we
cease to be lawyers in any common sense meaning of the term? We can
only address that question as we work to stretch the boundaries of the
lawyer role through new, less lawyer-dominated advocacy practices.
Second, as a practical matter, how do we find time for
self-transformation amid the pressing demands of our day to day work?
And how do we motivate our students to challenge the lawyer's
traditional privilege, just as they are beginning to enjoy it? And third,
why should we bother taking the challenge of self-transformation
seriously? Why should we worry over the ethical questions that are
embedded in our claim to transform others? Why should we seek to
change our own self-concepts and modes of practice? Why not just get
on with the urgent work of helping the poor?
There are at least two compelling reasons for taking these
questions seriously, and to commit ourselves to the project of our own
transformation. The first reason arises from the historical moment in
which we now work. Like it or not, over the last few years, we have
witnessed the demise of the grand social theories that authorized us to
see ourselves as part of an elite professional and academic "vanguard"
that could guide, or catalyze, or organize "oppressed groups" to change
the world. Those theories have been discredited on both political and
theoretical grounds. This debunking has been done by postmodernist
legal and social theorists, such as Boaventura de Sousa Santos and
Michel Foucault as much as by post-Marxist political leaders such as
Nelson Mandela and Vaclav Havel. The multiple, cross-cutting
character of identity, and of domination, is a fact of life in our post-
liberal world.7 We are no longer in an age of "scientistic" politics.
Rather, we are entering an era in which shifting coalitions of gay,
feminist, differently-abled, insurgent activists of colour enact their
"citizenship" through their efforts to achieve it, reshaping the process of
politics by refusing to fight among themselves over its spoils. In such a
world, we can no longer call upon vanguardist theories to position us as
the agents of other people's change. And any claim by legal clinics that
7 See, for example, J.W. Scott, "Multiculturalism and the Politics of Identity" in J. Rajchman
ed., The Identity in Question (New York: Routledge, 1995); and J.C. Scott, Domination and the Arts
of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990).
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it is our place to transform others' worlds is subtly premised on such
vanguardist pretensions.
The second reason to question our own status as change-agents
has been forcefully set forth in the writings of Gerald L6pez.8 His work
suggests that lawyers who seek to transform the world for their clients,
or to transform their clients to change the world, risk producing a very
different result. For the paradigm within which legal clinics transform
others pictures "the client" or the "community" as the entity with the
"problem" that needs the help of lawyers in order to "change." This
paradigm attributes to lawyers the insight to translate those problems
into the symptoms of political and economics subordination. It then
authorizes lawyers to prescribe the practices-be they impact litigation
or community organizing-that will reverse those pathologies. Within
this paradigm, it is the lawyers but not the clients, who are called upon to
act in the roles of fully human beings. In contrast, the clients are called
upon to respond to the lawyer's questions, and to comply with the
lawyers' instructions. One sign of how deeply this disabling paradigm
infects our most basic ideas of lawyering is the etymology of the term
"client," which can be traced back to a Latin verb referring to the
privilege of a Roman patrician to call "his" slaves by his own, the
master's, name.9
Thus, the very project that we, as progressive lawyers and
clinicians, undertake when we aspire to transform the world replicates
and therefore reinforces the subordination of impoverished peoples to
the world-making power of the elites who dominate their lives. So
stated, this proposition may sound like a nay-saying clich6, for it seems
to imply that lawyers have no legitimate role to play among poor people.
The importance of the new advocacy scholarship that Lopez and others
have undertaken is that, in defiance of apparent "logic," it does not
endorse this cynical conclusion. Rather, it assumes that the work of
lawyering for disenfranchised groups should be done, and then examines
how the day to day encounters of lawyers and poor people might be
re-scripted to give both clients and their lawyers more space for human
agency within this lawyering project.
The era of vanguard visions is over. The theories which
grounded those visions are in crisis. The violence which those visions
has supported is finally getting exposed in every area of social and
8 See G.P. L6pez, Rebellious Lawyering: One Chicano's Vision of Progressive Law Practice
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992).
9 See Oxford English Dictionary, 2d ed., prepared by J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner, vol. 3
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1989) at 320.
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political life. We can no longer repress this insight and return to a
complacent practice which positions us to draw the blueprints for
changing other people's lives. Rather, we have no morally consistent
option except to confront and embrace the tension between our
aspirations to "fix" the blatant injustices of poverty, and the poverty of
our claims to undertake that task. Our challenge is to hold on to our
commitments while at the same time questioning our own capacity and
legitimacy to act out the commitments that we have embraced. Our
challenge is to practise law for poor people in a way that looks inward,
resisting elitist concepts of lawyering, and at the same time looks
outward, seeking new ways to ally with "clients" and to join in mutual,
but keenly self-reflective, power-sensitive projects of change. As we
accept this challenge to change our own self-concepts and modes of
advocacy, our legal clinics and our visions of clinical education will
change as well. Given the times in which we find ourselves, we must take
such risks if we are to seek justice in the work that we do.

